

No. 13-1144

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

CONESTOGA WOOD SPECIALTIES CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania corporation;
NORMAN HAHN; ELIZABETH HAHN; NORMAN LEMAR HAHN; ANTHONY H. HAHN;
KEVIN HAHN,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Services;
SETH D. HARRIS, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of Labor; JACOB J. LEW, in his
official capacity as Secretary of the Treasury; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,

Defendants-Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA (No. 5:12-cv-06744) (Hon. Mitchell S. Goldberg)

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The court denied a preliminary injunction on January 11, 2013. *See* App 3. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on January 14, 2013. *See* App. 1. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. Whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) claim fails because RFRA does not allow a for-profit, secular corporation to deny federally required employee benefits on the basis of religion.

2. Whether the First Amendment claim fails because the contraceptive-coverage requirement is a neutral requirement of general applicability.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation (“Conestoga Wood”) is a for-profit corporation that manufactures wood cabinets. Conestoga Wood has 950 full-time employees. People employed by Conestoga Wood obtain health coverage for themselves and their family members through the Conestoga Wood group health plan, as part of their compensation packages that include wages and non-wage benefits.

The individual plaintiffs (“the Hahns”) are the controlling shareholders of the corporation. The Hahns allege that they regard certain forms of contraception

as contrary to their religious beliefs. The corporation, however, does not hire employees on the basis of their religion, and the employees thus are not required to share the religious beliefs of the Hahns.

In this action, Conestoga Wood and the Hahns contend that, under RFRA and the First Amendment, the Conestoga Wood group health plan is entitled to an exemption from the federal regulatory requirement that the plan cover all forms of Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)-approved contraceptives, as prescribed by a health care provider. Plaintiffs contend that such an exemption is required because the controlling shareholders have asserted a religious objection to the plan’s coverage of certain contraceptives.

The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that plaintiffs failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of their RFRA or First Amendment claim. *See* App. 4-37. This Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction pending appeal. *See* 2/7/13 Order.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

1. Federal law regulates many aspects of the employer-employee relationship, including wages and non-cash benefits. In addition to regulating wages and overtime pay in the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., Congress has regulated employee benefits such as group health

plans, pension plans, disability benefits, and life insurance benefits through the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and other statutes. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., an employer cannot discriminate on the basis of religion in setting the terms or conditions of employment, including employee compensation, unless the employer qualifies for Title VII’s religious exemption.

The federal government heavily subsidizes the form of employee compensation that is provided through employment-based group health plans. Most notably, employees typically do not pay taxes on their employer’s contributions to their health coverage, which are generally excluded from taxable compensation. *See* Congressional Budget Office, *Key Issues in Analyzing Major Health Insurance Proposals* 30 (2008). These federal tax subsidies totaled \$246 billion in 2007. *See id.* at 31. As a result of this longstanding federal support, employment-based group health plans are by far the predominant form of private health coverage. In 2009, employment-based plans covered about 160 million people. *See id.* at 4 & Table 1-1.

Congress has long regulated employment-based group health plans, and, in 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”) established certain additional minimum standards for such plans. As relevant here, the Affordable Care Act provides that a non-grandfathered plan must cover certain

preventive health services without cost-sharing, that is, without requiring plan participants and beneficiaries to make co-payments or pay deductibles. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13. This provision applies to employment-based group health plans covered by ERISA. *See* 29 U.S.C. § 1185d.

These preventive health services include immunizations recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, *see id.* § 300gg-13(a)(2); items or services that have an “A” or “B” rating from the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, *see id.* § 300gg-13(a)(1); preventive care and screenings for infants, children and adolescents as provided in guidelines of the Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”), a component of the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), *see id.* § 300gg-13(a)(3); and certain additional preventive services for women as provided in HRSA guidelines, *see id.* § 300gg-13(a)(4). The preventive health services coverage provision requires coverage of a wide array of recommended services such as immunizations, cholesterol screening, blood pressure screening, mammography, and cervical cancer screening.¹

¹ Coverage is also required for services such as colorectal cancer screening, alcohol misuse counseling, screening for iron deficiency anemia, bacteriuria screening for pregnant women, breastfeeding counseling, screening for sexually transmitted infections, depression screening for adolescents, hearing loss screening for newborns, tobacco use counseling and interventions, and vision screening for young children. *See generally* <http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/ACIP-list.htm>; <http://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/uspstf/uspsabrecs.htm>;

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2. When the Affordable Care Act was enacted, there were no existing HRSA guidelines relating to preventive care and screening for women. Accordingly, HHS asked the Institute of Medicine (“Institute” or “IOM”) to develop recommendations to help the Departments implement this aspect of the preventive health services coverage requirement. *See* Institute of Medicine, *Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps 2* (2011) (“IOM Report”).²

Consistent with the Institute’s recommendations, the guidelines developed by HRSA ensure coverage for annual well-woman visits, screening for gestational diabetes, human papillomavirus testing, counseling for sexually transmitted infections, HIV counseling and screening, breastfeeding support and supplies, and domestic violence counseling.³ In addition, the guidelines require coverage for “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity,” as prescribed by a provider.” 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (quoting the guidelines). FDA-approved contraceptive methods include oral

http://brightfutures.aap.org/pdfs/Guidelines_PDF/20-Appendices_PeriodicitySchedule.pdf.

² The Institute of Medicine, which was established by the National Academy of Sciences in 1970, is funded by Congress to provide expert advice to the federal government on matters of public health. *See* IOM Report iv.

³ *See* HRSA, Women’s Preventive Services: Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines, available at <http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines>.

contraceptive pills, diaphragms, injections and implants, emergency contraceptive drugs, and intrauterine devices (“IUDs”).⁴

The implementing regulations authorize an exemption from the contraceptive-coverage requirement for the group health plan of any organization that qualifies as a religious employer. In their current form, the regulations define a religious employer as an organization that (1) has the inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily employs persons who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily serves persons who share its religious tenets; and (4) is a non-profit organization described in a provision of the Internal Revenue Code that refers to churches, their integrated auxiliaries, conventions or associations of churches, and to the exclusively religious activities of any religious order. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B).

The Departments that issued the preventive health services coverage regulations have proposed an amendment that would simplify the exemption by eliminating the first three requirements set out above and clarify that the exemption is available to all non-profit organizations that fall within the scope of the relevant Internal Revenue Code provision. *See* 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8461 (Feb. 6, 2013) (notice of proposed rulemaking). In addition, the Departments have set out

⁴ *See* Birth Control Guide, FDA Office of Women’s Health, *available at* <http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForWomen/FreePublications/UCM282014.pdf> (last updated Aug. 2012).

proposals to accommodate religious objections to the provision of contraceptive coverage that have been raised by other non-profit, religious organizations. *See id.* at 8461-62.

The proposed accommodations do not extend to for-profit, secular corporations such as the plaintiff corporations in this case. *See id.* at 8462. The Departments explained that “[r]eligious accommodations in related areas of federal law, such as the exemption for religious organizations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, are available to nonprofit religious organizations but not to for-profit secular organizations.” *Ibid.* Consistent with this longstanding federal law, the Departments proposed to limit the definition of organizations eligible for the accommodations “to include nonprofit religious organizations, but not to include for-profit secular organizations.” *Ibid.*

B. Factual Background and District Court Proceedings

1. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation is a for-profit, Pennsylvania corporation that manufactures and sells wood cabinets. *See App.* 42 ¶ 11.

Conestoga Wood has 950 full-time employees throughout its various locations in the United States. *See App.* 45 ¶ 37.

The Hahns are the controlling shareholders of the corporation. *See App.* 42 ¶ 11. The Hahns allege certain forms of contraception are contrary to their religious beliefs. *See App.* 46-47 ¶¶ 45-46. The corporation, however, does not

hire employees on the basis of their religion, and the employees thus are not required to share the religious beliefs of the Hahns.

The Conestoga Wood group health plan provides health coverage as one of the non-cash benefits that Conestoga Wood employees receive as part of their compensation packages. *See* App. 45 ¶ 36. In this action, Conestoga Wood and the Hahns contend that, under RFRA and the First Amendment, the Conestoga Wood group health plan must be exempted from the requirement that the plan cover all forms of FDA-approved contraceptives, as prescribed by a health care provider.⁵

2. The district court denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, holding that plaintiffs failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of their RFRA or First Amendment claim. *See* App. 4-37. This Court denied plaintiffs' motion for an injunction pending appeal. *See* 2/7/13 Order.

⁵ Although plaintiffs describe certain forms of FDA-approved contraceptives as abortifacients, *see* App. 46-47 ¶¶ 45-48, these drugs are not abortifacients within the meaning of federal law. *See* 62 Fed. Reg. 8610, 8611 (Feb. 25, 1997) ("Emergency contraceptive pills are not effective if the woman is pregnant; they act by delaying or inhibiting ovulation, and/or altering tubal transport of sperm and/or ova (thereby inhibiting fertilization), and/or altering the endometrium (thereby inhibiting implantation)."); 45 C.F.R. § 46.202(f) ("Pregnancy encompasses the period of time from implantation until delivery.").

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation is a for-profit corporation that manufactures and sells wood cabinets. The corporation has 950 full-time employees in its various locations throughout the United States. People employed by Conestoga Wood receive health coverage for themselves and their family members through the Conestoga Wood group health plan, as part of their compensation packages that include wages and non-wage benefits.

In this suit, plaintiffs contend that the Conestoga Wood group health plan must be exempted from the federal regulatory requirement to cover all forms of FDA-approved contraceptives, as prescribed by a health care provider. Plaintiffs argue that this exemption is mandated by RFRA and the First Amendment because the Hahns, who are the corporation's controlling shareholders, have asserted a religious objection to the plan's coverage of contraceptives. Comparable claims have been asserted in other litigation by for-profit corporations engaged in a wide variety of secular pursuits, such as the manufacture and sale of fuel systems, vehicle safety systems, arts and crafts supplies, mineral and chemical products, and fresh produce.⁶ The plaintiffs' theory in these cases is that, if a shareholder asserts

⁶ See, e.g., *Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius*, 2012 WL 6845677 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2012), *appeal pending*, No. 12-2673 (6th Cir.) (fuel systems); *Grote Industries, LLC v. Sebelius*, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2012 WL 6725905 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 27, 2012), *appeal pending*, No. 13-1077 (7th Cir.) (vehicle safety systems); *O'Brien v. HHS*,

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a religious objection to a law that regulates the corporation, then the law must be subjected to strict scrutiny. On this reasoning, for-profit, secular corporations would have the “right to ignore antidiscrimination laws, refuse to pay payroll taxes, violate OSHA requirements, etc. in the name of religious freedom,” unless “the law at issue satisfies strict scrutiny,” Pl. Br. 37, which is “the most demanding test known to constitutional law.” Pl. Br. 44 (quoting *City of Boerne v. Flores*, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997)).

Congress, however, was careful to avoid that result. Congress has long distinguished between religious organizations and for-profit, secular corporations, and Congress has granted religious organizations alone the latitude to discriminate on the basis of religion in setting the terms and conditions of employment, including compensation. No court has ever found a for-profit company to be a religious organization for purposes of federal law. To the contrary, courts have emphasized that an entity’s for-profit status is an objective criterion that allows courts to distinguish a secular company from a potentially religious organization, without conducting an intrusive inquiry into the entity’s religious beliefs. *See, e.g.*,

__F. Supp. 2d __, 2012 WL 4481208 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012), *appeal pending*, No. 12-3357 (8th Cir.) (mineral and chemical products); *Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius*, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012), *appeal pending*, No. 12-6294 (10th Cir.) (arts and crafts supplies); *Gilardi v. Sebelius*, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2013 WL 781150 (D.D.C. March 3, 2013), *appeal pending*, No. 13-5069 (D.C. Cir.) (fresh produce).

University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1343-44 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (organization qualifies for a religious exemption if, among other things, it is “organized as a ‘nonprofit’” and holds itself out as religious).

RFRA, which was enacted against the background of these federal employment statutes, carried forward this distinction between non-profit, religious organizations and for-profit, secular companies by requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate a substantial burden on “a person’s exercise of religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). “[F]or-profit corporate entities, unlike religious non-profit organizations, do not—and cannot—legally claim a right to exercise or establish a ‘corporate’ religion under the First Amendment or the RFRA.” *Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius*, No. 13-1144, slip op. 6 (3d Cir. Feb. 7, 2013) (Garth, J., concurring) (emphases omitted). The distinction between non-profit, religious organizations and for-profit, secular companies is rooted in “the text of the First Amendment,” *Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC*, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012), and embodied in federal law.

Plaintiffs cannot circumvent this distinction by asserting that the contraceptive-coverage requirement is a substantial burden on the Hahn’s personal exercise of religion. “The mandate does not compel the [Hahns] as individuals to do anything.” *Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius*, 2012 WL 6845677, *7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2012), *appeal pending*, No. 12-2673 (6th Cir.). “It is only the legally

separate” corporation that has “any obligation under the mandate.” *Ibid.* It is Conestoga Wood that acts as the employing party; it is Conestoga Wood that sponsors the group health plan for employees and their family members; and “it is that health plan which is now obligated by the Affordable Care Act and resulting regulations to provide contraceptive coverage.” *Grote v. Sebelius*, ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 362725, *6 (7th Cir. Jan. 30, 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting).

Conestoga Wood “is a distinct and separate entity, irrespective of the persons who own all its stock.” *Barium Steel Corp. v. Wiley*, 108 A.2d 336, 341 (Pa. 1954). Although plaintiffs seek to elide this distinction, “incorporation’s basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it employs.” *Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King*, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001). “So long as the business’s liabilities are not [the Hahns’] liabilities—which is the primary and ‘invaluable privilege’ conferred by the corporate form, *Torco Oil Co. v. Innovative Thermal Corp.*, 763 F. Supp. 1445, 1451 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (Posner, J., sitting by designation)—neither are the business’s expenditures the [Hahns’] own expenditures.” *Ibid.* The obligation to provide health coverage and the money used to pay for it “belong[] to the company, not to” the Hahns. *Ibid.*

Moreover, even apart from this central flaw in plaintiffs' argument, their RFRA claim fails because an employee's decision to use her health coverage to pay for a particular item or service cannot properly be attributed to her employer, much less to the corporation's shareholders. In other First Amendment contexts, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a person or entity that provides a source of funding may not be deemed responsible for the decisions that another person or entity makes in using those funds. "To the extent the [Hahns] themselves are funding anything at all—and . . . one must disregard the corporate form to say that they are—they are paying for a plan that insures a comprehensive range of medical care that will be used in countless ways" by Conestoga Wood's 950 full-time employees and their family members. *Grote*, 2013 WL 362725, *13 (Rovner, J., dissenting). "No individual decision by an employee and her physician—be it to use contraception, treat an infection, or have a hip replaced—is in any meaningful sense the [Hahns'] decision or action." *Ibid.* "RFRA does not protect against the slight burden on religious exercise that arises when one's money circuitously flows to support the conduct of other free-exercise-wielding individuals who hold religious beliefs that differ from one's own." *O'Brien v. HHS*, __F. Supp. 2d __, 2012 WL 4481208, *6 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012), *appeal pending*, No. 12-3357 (8th Cir.).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews the denial of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion and reviews questions of law de novo. *See American Express Travel Related Services v. Sidamon-Eristoff*, 669 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 2012).

ARGUMENT

A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” *Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). A plaintiff “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” *Id.* at 20; *see also Am. Express Travel Related Servs.*, 669 F.3d at 366. The district court correctly held that Conestoga Wood and the Hahns failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their claims.

I. RFRA Does Not Allow A For-Profit, Secular Corporation To Deny Employee Benefits On The Basis Of Religion.

RFRA provides that the federal government “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless that burden is the least restrictive means to further a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (b). Plaintiffs contend that, in enacting this statute, Congress gave for-profit, secular corporations the “right to ignore antidiscrimination laws, refuse to pay payroll

taxes, violate OSHA requirements, etc. in the name of religious freedom,” unless “the law at issue satisfies strict scrutiny,” Pl. Br. 37, which, plaintiffs emphasize, is “the most demanding test known to constitutional law.” Pl. Br. 44 (quoting *City of Boerne v. Flores*, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997)).

Congress, however, took pains to avoid that result. First, by requiring a plaintiff to show that a regulation substantially burdens “a person’s exercise of religion,” Congress carried forward the existing distinction between non-profit, religious organizations, which may engage in the exercise of religion, and for-profit, secular corporations, which may not. Second, by amending the initial version of RFRA to add the word “substantially,” Congress “ma[de] it clear that the compelling interest standard[] set forth in the act” applies “only to Government actions [that] place a substantial burden” on a person’s exercise of religion. 139 Cong. Rec. S14350-01, S14352 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); *see also ibid.* (text of Amendment No. 1082). Third, by restoring the legal framework “set forth in *Sherbert v. Verner*, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205 (1972),” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1), Congress made clear that courts should look to these and other Supreme Court cases that pre-date *Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), to determine whether a regulation substantially burdens a person’s religious exercise. *See* 139 Cong. Rec. S14350-01, S14352 (daily ed. Oct. 26,

1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“The amendment we will offer today is intended to make it clear that the pre-*Smith* law is applied under the RFRA in determining whether” a governmental burden on religion “must meet the test.”); *cf.* 146 Cong. Rec. S7774–01, 7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy) (under the parallel language of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), “[t]he term ‘substantial burden’ . . . is not intended to be given any broader interpretation than the Supreme Court’s articulation of the concept of substantial burden or religious exercise”). No pre-*Smith* case held—or even suggested—that the regulation of for-profit, secular corporations is subject to strict scrutiny.

A. Conestoga Wood Is Not A Person Engaged In The Exercise Of Religion Within The Meaning Of RFRA.

1. RFRA requires a plaintiff to show, as a threshold matter, that a challenged regulation is a substantial burden on “a person’s exercise of religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (b). Plaintiffs cannot make that showing because Conestoga Wood is not a “person” engaged in the “exercise of religion” within the meaning of RFRA or other federal statutes that provide accommodations for an organization’s religious beliefs.

It is common ground that the term “person” can include a corporation as well as an individual. *See* Pl. Br. 12 (citing the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1). It is also common ground that secular corporations enjoy certain First Amendment

rights, such as the freedoms of speech and association. *See* Pl. Br. 13 (citing *Citizens United v. FEC*, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (freedom of speech)).

But, whereas the First Amendment freedoms of speech and association are “right[s] enjoyed by religious and secular groups alike,” the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause “gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.” *Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC*, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012). That special solicitude for religious organizations is rooted in “the text of the First Amendment.” *Ibid.*

Congress likewise has shown a special solicitude for religious organizations in federal statutes that regulate the relationship between employers and their employees. At the same time, however, Congress has not permitted for-profit, secular corporations to invoke religion as a basis to defeat the requirements of federal employment law.

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer cannot discriminate on the basis of religion in the terms or conditions of employment, including employee compensation, unless the employer is “a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (collectively, “religious organization”). Similarly, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of disability, includes specific exemptions for religious organizations. *See* 42 U.S.C.

§ 12113(d)(1), (2); *Hosanna-Tabor*, 132 S. Ct. at 701 n.1 (discussing the ADA exemptions). And the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which gives employees collective bargaining and other rights, has been interpreted to exempt church-operated educational institutions from the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. *See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago*, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).

The organizations found to qualify for these religious exemptions all have been non-profit, religious organizations, as in *Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos*, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987). There, the Supreme Court held that a gymnasium run by the Mormon Church was free to discharge a building engineer who failed to observe the Church’s standards in such matters as regular church attendance, tithing, and abstinence from coffee, tea, alcohol, and tobacco. *See id.* at 330 & n.4. In so holding, the Court stressed that the Church did not operate the gym on a for-profit basis. *See id.* at 339.⁷

⁷ *See also, e.g., LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center Ass’n*, 503 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 2007) (non-profit Jewish community center); *Kennedy v. St. Joseph’s Ministries, Inc.*, 657 F.3d 189, 190 (4th Cir. 2011) (non-profit nursing-care facility run by an order of the Roman Catholic Church); *Spencer v. World Vision, Inc.*, 633 F.3d 723, 724-725 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (non-profit Christian humanitarian organization); *Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County*, 450 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2006) (non-profit Hispanic Baptist congregation affiliated with the Southern Baptist Convention).

Likewise, in the RFRA and free exercise cases on which plaintiffs rely, the claimants were non-profit, religious organizations. *See* Pl. Br. 13 (citing *Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal*, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) (RFRA claimant was a religious sect); *Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah*, 508 U.S. 520, 525 (1993) (“Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. (Church), is a not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law”)); *see also* Pl. Br. 21-22 (citing *Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School*, 132 S. Ct. at 699 (church-operated school)).

The Supreme Court and courts of appeals have emphasized that for-profit status is an objective criterion that allows courts to distinguish a secular company from a potentially religious organization, without making intrusive inquiries into an entity’s religious beliefs. “As the *Amos* Court noted, it is hard to draw a line between the secular and religious activities of a religious organization.” *University of Great Falls v. NLRB*, 278 F.3d 1335, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 2002). By contrast, “it is relatively straight-forward to distinguish between a non-profit and a for-profit entity.” *Ibid.*

Thus, the D.C. Circuit held that an organization qualifies for the religious exemption in the NLRA if, among other things, the organization is “organized as a ‘nonprofit’” and holds itself out as religious. *Id.* at 1343 (quoting *Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB*, 793 F.2d 383, 400, 403 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc)

(opinion of then-Judge Breyer)). The D.C. Circuit explained that this bright-line distinction prevents courts from “trolling through a person’s or institution’s religious beliefs.” *Id.* at 1341-42 (quoting *Mitchell v. Helms*, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (plurality opinion)). The D.C. Circuit stressed that the “prohibition on such intrusive inquiries into religious beliefs underlay” the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Title VII religious exemption in *Amos*. *Id.* at 1342.

Similarly, in *Spencer v. World Vision, Inc.*, 633 F.3d 723, 734 (9th Cir. 2011), Judge O’Scannlain explained that the Title VII religious exemption must “center[] on neutral factors (i.e., whether an entity is a nonprofit and whether it holds itself out as religious),” “[r]ather than forcing courts to ‘troll[] through the beliefs of [an organization], making determinations about its religious mission.”” *Id.* at 734 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (quoting *Great Falls*, 278 F.3d at 1342).

In enacting RFRA, Congress carried forward the background principles reflected in pre-existing federal employment statutes, by requiring a plaintiff to show a substantial burden on a person’s exercise of religion. Under RFRA, as under these pre-existing federal statutes, an entity’s for-profit status is an objective criterion that allows courts to distinguish a secular corporation from a potentially religious organization. “[F]or-profit corporate entities, unlike religious non-profit organizations, do not—and cannot—legally claim a right to exercise or establish a ‘corporate’ religion under the First Amendment or the RFRA.” *Conestoga Wood*

Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 13-1144, slip op. at 6 (3d Cir. Feb. 7, 2013) (Garth, J., concurring) (emphases omitted); *see also* App. 16 (finding no “historical support for the proposition that a secular, for-profit corporation possesses the right to exercise religion”); *Hobby Lobby Stores*, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 (“Plaintiffs have not cited, and the court has not found, any case concluding that secular, for-profit corporations . . . have a constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.”); *Briscoe v. Sebelius*, ___ F. Supp. ___, 2013 WL 755413, *5 (D. Colo. Feb. 27, 2013) (“Secular, for-profit corporations neither exercise nor practice religion.”).

Plaintiffs do not claim that Conestoga Wood qualifies for the religious exemptions in Title VII, the ADA, the NLRA, or any other federal statute that regulates the employment relationship. Likewise, RFRA provides no basis to exempt Conestoga Wood from the regulations that govern the health coverage under the Conestoga group health plan, which is a significant aspect of employee compensation.

Plaintiffs underscore their misunderstanding of the issue when they emphasize that for-profit corporations can engage in “quintessentially religious acts such as tithing” and “donating money to charities.” Pl. Br. 34. Federal law does not prohibit for-profit corporations from donating money to religious charities. But Conestoga Wood does not claim that it could compel *its employees* to donate to religious charities or to tithe their salaries. Only a religious

organization, like that at issue in *Amos*, can require its employees to tithe. *See Amos*, 483 U.S. at 330 & n.4. Conestoga Wood is not a religious organization, and it therefore must afford its secular workforce the employee benefits that are required by federal law.

B. The Obligation To Cover Contraceptives Lies With Conestoga Wood, Not With The Corporation's Shareholders.

1. Plaintiffs cannot circumvent the distinction between religious organizations and secular corporations by attempting to shift the focus of the RFRA inquiry from Conestoga Wood to the Hahns, who are the corporation's controlling shareholders. Federal law does not require the Hahns personally to provide health coverage to Conestoga Wood employees, or to satisfy the myriad other requirements that federal law places on Conestoga Wood. These obligations lie with the corporation itself.

The contraceptive-coverage requirement “does not compel the [Hahns] as individuals to do anything.” *Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius*, 2012 WL 6845677, *7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2012), *appeal pending*, No. 12-2673 (6th Cir.). “It is only the legally separate” corporation that has “any obligation under the mandate.” *Ibid.* It is Conestoga Wood that acts as the employing party; it is Conestoga Wood that sponsors the group health plan for employees and their family members; and “it is that health plan which is now obligated by the Affordable Care Act and

resulting regulations to provide contraceptive coverage.” *Grote v. Sebelius*, ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 362725, *6 (7th Cir. Jan. 30, 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting).

Conestoga Wood “is a distinct and separate entity, irrespective of the persons who own all its stock.” *Barium Steel Corp. v. Wiley*, 108 A.2d 336, 341 (Pa. 1954). Although plaintiffs seek to elide this distinction, the Supreme Court has stressed that “incorporation’s basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it employs.” *Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King*, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001) (quoted at App. 20); *see also Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson*, 538 U.S. 468, 474 (2003) (“A basic tenet of American corporate law is that the corporation and its shareholders are distinct entities.”).

“Generally, courts allow a shareholder to sue only where there is a direct injury to the shareholder in his or her individual capacity, independent of any duty owed the corporation.” *Kush v. American States Ins. Co.*, 853 F.2d 1380, 1383 (7th Cir. 1988). This “shareholder standing rule applies even if the plaintiff is the sole shareholder of the corporation.” *Potthoff v. Morin*, 245 F.3d 710, 716 (8th Cir. 2001). Moreover, the rule applies even where—unlike here—an injury to the corporation diminishes the value of the shareholder’s stock and thus causes the shareholder concrete and personal injury. “The derivative injury rule holds that a

shareholder (even a shareholder in a closely-held corporation) may not sue for personal injuries that result directly from injuries to the corporation.” *In re Kaplan*, 143 F.3d 807, 811-812 (3d Cir. 1998) (Alito, J.). The “corporate form confers many advantages, in return for which the shareholder relinquishes several prerogatives, ‘including that of direct legal action to redress an injury to him as primary stockholder in the business.’” *Potthoff*, 245 F.3d at 716 (quoting *Kush*, 853 F.2d at 1384). A shareholder “‘may not move freely between corporate and individual status to gain the advantages and avoid the disadvantages of the respective forms.’” *Ibid.* (quoting *Kush*, 853 F.2d at 1384)).

“While this rule, which recognizes that corporations are entities separate from their shareholders in contradistinction with partnerships or other unincorporated associations, is regularly encountered in traditional business litigation, it also has been uniformly applied on the infrequent occasions it has arisen in suits against the state for statutory or constitutional violations.” *Smith-Setzer & Sons, Inc. v. South Carolina Procurement Review Board*, 20 F.3d 1311, 1317 (4th Cir. 1994). Thus, courts of appeals have repeatedly applied the shareholder standing rule to bar First Amendment and other constitutional claims alleged pursuant to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983.⁸

⁸ See, e.g., *Diva’s Inc. v. City of Bangor*, 411 F.3d 30, 42 (1st Cir. 2005) (“we join the circuits who have already addressed the issue to hold that this

Continued on next page.

These basic tenets of corporate law foreclose the Hahns' contention that regulation of the Conestoga Wood group health plan should be regarded as a burden on the Hahns in their personal capacities. "The owners of an LLC or corporation, even a closely-held one, have an obligation to respect the corporate form, on pain of losing the benefits of that form should they fail to do so." *Grote*, 2013 WL 362725, *6 (Rovner, J., dissenting). The Hahns "are not at liberty to treat the company's bank accounts as their own; co-mingling personal and corporate funds is a classic sign that a company owner is disregarding the corporate form and treating the business as his alter ego." *Ibid.* "So long as the business's liabilities are not the [Hahns'] liabilities—which is the primary and 'invaluable privilege' conferred by the corporate form, *Torco Oil Co. v. Innovative Thermal Corp.*, 763 F. Supp. 1445, 1451 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (Posner, J., sitting by designation)—neither are the business's expenditures the [Hahns'] own

standing requirement also applies to actions brought to redress injuries to a corporation under Section 1983") (citing *Potthoff v. Morin*, 245 F.3d 710, 717 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the shareholder standing rule applies to civil rights actions brought pursuant to § 1983); *Flynn v. Merrick*, 881 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that "filing suit under § 1983 does not diminish the requirement that the shareholder suffer some individual, direct injury"); *Gregory v. Mitchell*, 634 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1981) (extending shareholder standing rule to civil rights actions under § 1983); *Erlich v. Glasner*, 418 F.2d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1969) (finding "nothing in the Civil Rights Act" that would permit a plaintiff-stockholder to circumvent the rule that "even though a stockholder owns all, or practically all, of the stock in a corporation, such a fact of itself does not authorize him to sue as an individual"))).

expenditures.” *Ibid.* The obligation to provide health coverage under the Conestoga Wood group health plan and the money used to pay for that coverage “belong[] to the company, not to the” Hahns. *Ibid.*

As the district court explained, “[i]t would be entirely inconsistent to allow the Hahns to enjoy the benefits of incorporation, while simultaneously piercing the corporate veil for the limited purpose of challenging” the contraceptive-coverage requirement. App. 19. The Hahns have chosen to conduct business through a corporation, with the “accompanying rights and benefits and limited liability.” *Gilardi v. Sebelius*, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2013 WL 781150, *4 (D.D.C. March 3, 2013), *appeal pending*, No. 13-5069 (D.C. Cir.). They cannot simply disregard that same corporate status when it is advantageous to do so.” *Ibid.* “The law protects that separation between the corporation and its owners for many worthwhile purposes.” *Autocam Corp.*, 2012 WL 6845677, *7. “Neither the law nor equity can ignore the separation when assessing claimed burdens on the individual owners’ free exercise of religion caused by requirements imposed on the corporate entities they own.” *Ibid.*

2. None of the pre-*Smith* Supreme Court cases that formed the background to RFRA departed from these established tenets of corporate law. The one pre-*Smith* free exercise case that involved employee benefits, *United States v. Lee*, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), considered a free exercise claim raised by an individual

employer, not by a corporation or its shareholders. Moreover, *Lee* rejected the “free exercise claim brought by [an] individual Amish employer who argued that paying Social Security taxes for his employees interfered with his exercise of religion.” *Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius*, 133 S. Ct. 641, 643 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., in chambers). Even with respect to that individual employer, the Supreme Court stressed that, “[w]hen followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activities as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.” *Lee*, 455 U.S. at 261. The Court explained that “[g]ranting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the employer’s religious faith on the employees,” *ibid.*, who would be denied their social security benefits if the employer did not pay the social security taxes.

The two cases cited in RFRA itself—*Sherbert v. Verner*, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)—did not involve either corporate regulation or employee benefits. In *Sherbert*, the Supreme Court held that a state government could not deny unemployment compensation to an individual who lost her job because her religious beliefs prevented her from working on a Saturday. And, in *Yoder*, the Court held that a state government could not compel Amish parents to send their children to high school. Plaintiffs

rely on *Thomas v. Review Board*, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), but, there, the Supreme Court simply applied *Sherbert*'s reasoning to hold that a state government could not deny unemployment compensation to an individual who lost his job because of his religious beliefs. *See also Gilardi*, 2013 WL 781150, *9 (“Plaintiffs misread *Thomas*.” “In that case, . . . the burden of the denial of benefits rested with the person exercising his religion, not a separate person or corporate entity, as is the case here.”), *appeal pending*, No. 13-5089 (D.C. Cir.).

Plaintiffs note that two Ninth Circuit cases allowed for-profit corporations to assert free exercise claims on behalf of their owners, which the Ninth Circuit then rejected on the merits. *See* Pl. Br. 23 n.10 (citing *EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co.*, 859 F.2d 610, 620 n.15 (9th Cir. 1988); and *Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky*, 586 F.3d 1109, 1119-20 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2009)). In addressing standing, the Ninth Circuit overlooked the tenets of corporate law discussed above. In any event, the issue of standing to assert a First Amendment claim is distinct from the question whether a plaintiff has stated a violation of RFRA. The injury in fact that is necessary to establish standing need not be large; an ““identifiable trifle is enough for standing.”” *Lozano v. City of Hazelton*, 620 F.3d 170, 186 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting *United States v. SCRAP*, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973)). RFRA, by contrast, requires a plaintiff to show that a federal regulation “*substantially*

burden[s]” a person’s exercise of religion, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit decisions thus do not support plaintiffs’ RFRA claim.

Plaintiffs also rely on *McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc.*, 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), but, there, a state hearing examiner “pierced the ‘corporate veil’” to make the individual owners of the stock and assets of a corporation “liable for the illegal actions of” the corporation. *McClure*, 370 N.W.2d at 850-51 & n.12. Moreover, the *McClure* court rejected the free exercise claim because the corporate plaintiff was “not a religious corporation—it is a Minnesota business corporation engaged in business for profit.” *Id.* at 853.⁹

C. Decisions That Employees Make About How To Use Their Compensation Cannot Properly Be Attributed To The Corporation Or Its Shareholders.

For the reasons discussed above, plaintiffs’ attempt to conflate Conestoga Wood and its shareholders cannot salvage their RFRA claim. Even apart from this central flaw in plaintiffs’ argument, their claim fails because an employee’s decision to use her health coverage for a particular item or service cannot properly be attributed to her employer, much less to the corporations’ shareholders.

⁹ Other cases cited by plaintiffs (Pl. Br. 23 n.10) are inapposite. *Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Hooker*, 680 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2012), rejected a free exercise challenge to a state law that regulated kosher food labels. In *Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius*, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2012 WL 5817323, *6-7 & n.10 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2012), *appeal pending*, No. 13-5018 (D.C. Cir.), the district court relied on the “unique corporate structure” of the plaintiff, which was 96.5% owned by a non-profit, religious organization.

Conestoga Wood employees are free to use the wages they receive from the corporation to pay for contraceptives. Plaintiffs do not suggest that these individual decisions by Conestoga Wood employees can be attributed to the corporation or to its shareholders. “Implementing the challenged mandate will keep the locus of decision-making in exactly the same place: namely, with each employee, and not” the corporation or its shareholders. *Autocam Corp.*, 2012 WL 6845677, *6. “It will also involve the same economic exchange at the corporate level: employees will earn a wage or benefit with their labor, and money originating from [Conestoga Wood] will pay for it.” *Ibid.*

A group health plan “covers many medical services, not just contraception.” *Grote*, 2013 WL 362725, *13 (Rovner, J., dissenting). “To the extent the [Hahns’] are funding anything at all—and . . . one must disregard the corporate form to say that they are—they are paying for a plan that insures a comprehensive range of medical care that will be used in countless ways” by Conestoga Wood’s 950 full-time employees and their family members. *Ibid.* The decision as to what specific “services will be used is left to the employee and her doctor.” *Ibid.* “No individual decision by an employee and her physician—be it to use contraception, treat an infection, or have a hip replaced—is in any meaningful sense the [Hahns’] decision or action.” *Ibid.*

Plaintiffs' contrary position is at odds with the analysis used by the Supreme Court in other First Amendment contexts. In analyzing Establishment Clause challenges, the Supreme Court has recognized that a state does not, by providing a source of funding, necessarily become responsible for an individual's decisions in using those funds. In *Zelman v. Simmons-Harris*, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), for example, the Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a state school voucher program. Of the more than 3,700 students who participated in the program during one school year, 96% of them used the vouchers to enroll at religiously affiliated schools. *See id.* at 647. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the flow of voucher funds to religiously affiliated schools was not properly attributable to the State. The Court reasoned that “[t]he incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits.” *Id.* at 652. And it explained that “no reasonable observer would think a neutral program of private choice, where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of the numerous independent decisions of private individuals, carries with it the imprimatur of government endorsement.” *Id.* at 655.

The Supreme Court employed similar reasoning in *Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth*, 529 U.S. 217 (2000), to reject a First Amendment

challenge to a student activity fee that required the complaining students “to pay fees which are subsidies for speech they find objectionable, even offensive.” *Id.* at 230. The Court noted that the funds were distributed to student groups on a view-point neutral basis, and explained that this system prevented “any mistaken impression that the student [groups] speak for the University” or the objecting students. *Id.* at 233 (quoting *Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.*, 515 U.S. 819, 841 (1995)).

It would be equally inappropriate to attribute an employee’s decision to use her comprehensive health coverage for a particular item or service to the employer that pays for or contributes to the plan. An “employer, by virtue of paying (whether in part or in whole) for an employee’s health care, does not become a party to the employee’s health care decisions: the employer acquires no right to intrude upon the employee’s relationship with her physician and participate in her medical decisions, nor, conversely, does it incur responsibility for the quality and results of an employee’s health care if it is not actually delivering that care to the employee.” *Grote*, 2013 WL 362725, *13 (Rovner, J., dissenting). Indeed, “the Privacy Rule incorporated into the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) imposes a wall of confidentiality between an employee’s health care decisions (and the plan’s financial support for those decisions) and the employer.” *Id.* at *6.

The connection between an employee's medical decisions and the corporation's shareholders is even more attenuated than the connection between an employee's medical decisions and the corporation. The Hahns are, "in both law and fact, separated by multiple steps from both the coverage that the company health plan provides and from the decisions that individual employees make in consultation with their physicians as to what covered services they will use." *Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius*, slip op. 3 (3d Cir. Feb. 7, 2013) (Garth, J., concurring) (quoting *Grote*, 2013 WL 362725, *6-7) (Rovner, J., dissenting)). To hold that "a company shareholder's religious beliefs and practices are implicated by the autonomous health care decisions of company employees, such that the obligation to insure those decisions, when objected to by a shareholder, represents a substantial burden on that shareholder's religious liberties" would be "an unusually expansive understanding of what acts in the commercial sphere meaningfully interfere with an individual's religious beliefs and practices." *Grote*, 2013 WL 362725, *14 (Rovner, J., dissenting). "RFRA does not protect against the slight burden on religious exercise that arises when one's money circuitously flows to support the conduct of other free-exercise-wielding individuals who hold religious beliefs that differ from one's own." *O'Brien v. HHS*, ___F. Supp. 2d ___, 2012 WL 4481208, *6 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012), *appeal pending*, No. 12-3357 (8th Cir.); *see also Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v.*

Sebelius, slip op. 4 (3d Cir. Feb. 7, 2013) (citing *Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius*, 2012 WL 6930302, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (RFRA does not “encompass the independent conduct of third parties with whom the plaintiffs have only a commercial relationship”).¹⁰

D. The Contraceptive-Coverage Requirement Is Narrowly Tailored To Advance Compelling Governmental Interests.

Because the contraceptive-coverage requirement does not impose a substantial burden on any exercise of religion by Conestoga Wood or the Hahns, there is no reason to consider whether such a burden is justified as the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). In any event, plaintiffs’ argument fails on this secondary inquiry as well, because the contraceptive-coverage requirement is narrowly tailored to advance compelling governmental interests in public health and gender equality. Indeed, the particular health services at issue here relate to an interest—a woman’s control over her procreation—that is so compelling as to be constitutionally

¹⁰ Indeed, even church-operated enterprises are required to pay employees the minimum wage. *See Donovan v. Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation*, 722 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 1984) (rejecting free exercise challenge to the Fair Labor Standards Act because “enforcement of wage and hour provisions cannot possibly have any direct impact on appellants’ freedom to worship and evangelize as they please”), *aff’d*, 471 U.S. 290 (1985); *DeArment v. Harvey*, 932 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the FLSA applies to church-run schools and that “any minimal free exercise burden was justified by the compelling governmental interest in enforcing the minimum wage and equal pay provisions of the FLSA”).

protected from state interference. *See Hobby Lobby Stores*, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1296; *see also Eisenstadt v. Baird*, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”); *Griswold v. Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state law that banned use of contraceptives unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital privacy).

1. “[T]he Government clearly has a compelling interest in safeguarding the public health by regulating the health care and insurance markets.” *Mead v. Holder*, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 43 (D.D.C. 2011), *aff’d*, *Seven-Sky v. Holder*, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Affordable Care Act increases access to recommended preventive health services by requiring that these services be covered without cost sharing, that is, without requiring plan participants and beneficiaries to make co-payments or pay deductibles. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13.

Even small increments in cost sharing have been shown to reduce the use of recommended preventive health services. *See* IOM Report 108-109. “Cost barriers to use of the most effective contraceptive methods are important because long-acting, reversible contraceptive methods and sterilization have high up-front costs.” *Id.* at 108. “A recent study conducted by Kaiser Permanente found that when out-of-pocket costs for contraceptives were eliminated or reduced, women

were more likely to rely on more effective long-acting contraceptive methods.” *Id.* at 109.

In addition to protecting a woman’s compelling interest in autonomy over her procreation, *see Eisenstadt*, 405 U.S. at 453, access to contraceptives is a crucial public health protection because an unintended pregnancy can have major negative health consequences for both the woman and the developing fetus. The Institute of Medicine described the harms to the woman and fetus that can occur when pregnancies are unintended. *See* IOM Report 103. For example, short intervals between pregnancies are associated with low birth weight and prematurity. *See ibid.* When a pregnancy is unintended, a woman may delay prenatal care or prolong behaviors that present risks for the developing fetus. *See ibid.* And, for women with certain medical conditions (such as diabetes), pregnancy can pose serious health risks. *See id.* at 103-104.

The requirement to cover women’s recommended preventive health services without cost sharing also protects the distinct compelling interest in gender equality. The Supreme Court has recognized the “importance, both to the individual and to society, of removing the barriers to economic advancement and political and social integration that have historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups, including women.” *Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees*, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984). “Assuring women equal access to . . . goods, privileges, and advantages clearly

furthering compelling state interests.” *Ibid.* In enacting the Affordable Care Act’s preventive health services coverage requirement, Congress found that “women have different health needs than men, and these needs often generate additional costs.” 155 Cong. Rec. S12106-02, S12114 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 2009) (Sen. Feinstein). “Women of childbearing age spend 68 percent more in out-of-pocket health care costs than men.” *Ibid.* And this disproportionate burden on women creates “financial barriers . . . that prevent women from achieving health and well-being for themselves and their families.” IOM Report 20. The women’s preventive health services coverage requirement is designed to equalize preventive health services coverage for women and men, through, among other things, increased access to family planning services for women. *See, e.g.*, 155 Cong. Rec. at S12114 (Sen. Feinstein); *see also* 77 Fed. Reg. at 8728.

2. There is no doubt that the exemption that plaintiffs demand here would undermine Congress’s objectives. Whereas Congress sought to increase access to women’s recommended preventive health services by requiring that these services be covered without cost sharing, plaintiffs seek to exclude coverage of certain contraceptives entirely from the Conestoga Wood plan. Thus, plaintiffs would require that Conestoga Wood employees pay for these contraceptives with their wages rather than with the health coverage that they earn as an employee benefit.

Plaintiffs do not explain what legal principle requires that Conestoga Wood employees pay for contraceptives by using their cash compensation rather than their non-cash health coverage benefits. Plaintiffs' demand to exclude coverage of these contraceptives from the Conestoga Wood plan would protect no one's religious practices and would impose a wholly unwarranted burden on individual employees and their family members.

Plaintiffs assert that the exemption they demand would not undermine the government's compelling interests because plans that collectively cover millions of employees are not subject to the statutory requirement to cover recommended preventive health services without cost sharing. Contrary to plaintiffs' contention (Pl. Br. 48), plans offered by small employers are not exempt from that requirement. Small businesses that elect to offer non-grandfathered health coverage to their employees are required to provide coverage for recommended preventive health services without cost sharing. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13. Moreover, small employers have business incentives to offer health coverage to their employees, and an otherwise eligible small employer would lose eligibility for certain tax benefits if it did not do so. *See* 26 U.S.C. § 45R.

Plaintiffs are likewise mistaken to assume that all or most grandfathered plans exclude contraceptive coverage. *See* Pl. Br. 46-47. The Institute of Medicine found that "[c]ontraceptive coverage has become standard practice for

most private insurance.” IOM Report 108. In any event, the Affordable Care Act’s grandfathering provision, 42 U.S.C. § 18011, does not have the effect of providing the type of permanent exemption from a coverage requirement that plaintiffs demand here. Although grandfathered plans are not subject to certain requirements, including the requirement to cover recommended preventive health services without cost sharing, the grandfathering provision is transitional in effect, and it is expected that a majority of plans will lose their grandfathered status by the end of 2013. *See* 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,552 (June 17, 2010).¹¹

Changes to a group health plan such as the elimination of certain benefits, an increase in cost-sharing requirements, or a decrease in employer contributions can cause a plan to lose its grandfathered status. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 147.140(g). The grandfathering provision is “a reasonable plan for instituting an incredibly complex health care law while balancing competing interests.” *Legatus v. Sebelius*, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2012 WL 5359630, *9 (Oct. 31, 2012), *appeal pending*, No. 13-1092

¹¹ Plaintiffs overstate the number of individuals covered under grandfathered plans. Their figures are drawn from the total number of individuals covered under health plans in existence at the start of 2010, and they disregard the fact that the number of grandfathered plans is steadily declining. *See, e.g.*, Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research & Educational Trust, Employer Health Benefits 2012 Annual Survey at 7-8, 190, *available at* <http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2012/8345.pdf> (last visited February 23, 2013) (indicating that 58 percent of firms had at least one grandfathered health plan in 2012, down from 72 percent in 2011, and that 48 percent of covered workers were in grandfathered health plans in 2012, down from 56 percent in 2011).

(6th Cir.). “To find the Government’s interests other than compelling only because of the grandfathering rule would perversely encourage Congress in the future to require immediate and draconian enforcement of all provisions of similar laws, without regard to pragmatic considerations, simply in order to preserve ‘compelling interest’ status.” *Ibid.*

3. Plaintiffs alternatively contend that regulating the terms of group health plans is not the least restrictive means to accomplish the government’s objectives. They assert that, instead, the government could “offer tax deductions or credits for the purchase of contraceptive services”; “expand eligibility for already existing federal programs that provide free contraception”; “allow citizens who pay to use contraceptives to submit receipts to the government for reimbursement”; or “provide incentives for pharmaceutical companies that manufacture contraceptives to provide such products to pharmacies, doctor’s offices, and health clinics free of charge.” Pl. Br. 51.

These proposals—which would require federal taxpayers to pay the cost of contraceptive services for the employees of for-profit, secular companies—reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of RFRA and the “least restrictive means” test that it incorporates. That test has never been interpreted to require the government to create or expand programs in order to “subsidize private religious practices.” *Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 85 P.3d 67, 94 (Cal.

2004) (rejecting challenge to a state-law requirement that certain health insurance policies cover prescription contraceptives).

II. Plaintiffs Fail To State A Claim Under The First Amendment.

The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause is not implicated when the government burdens a person's religious exercise through laws that are neutral and generally applicable. *See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). Even assuming *arguendo* that plaintiffs' free exercise rights are burdened by the contraceptive-coverage requirement, there is no Free Exercise Clause violation because the requirement is neutral and generally applicable. *See App. 20-22; see also Hobby Lobby Stores*, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1288-90; *O'Brien*, 2012 WL 4481208, *6-9; *Korte v. HHS*, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2012 WL 6553996, *7-8 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2012), *appeal pending*, No. 12-3841 (7th Cir.).

"Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated," and "failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied." *Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah*, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993). A law is not neutral "if the object of the law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation." *Id.* at 533. A law is not generally applicable if it "in a selective manner impose[s] burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief." *Id.* at 543.

A law need not be universal to be generally applicable. Exemptions undermining “general applicability” are those that disfavor religion. For example, the ordinance regulating animal slaughter in *Lukumi* was not generally applicable because it applied only to the religious practice of animal sacrifice, and not to hunting or other secular practices to which the asserted concerns of animal cruelty and public health applied with equal force. *See id.* at 542-46.

The requirement to cover women’s recommended preventive health services was established, not with the object of interfering with religious practices, but to improve women’s access to recommended health care and lessen the disparity between men’s and women’s health care costs. *See O’Brien*, 2012 WL 4481208, *7. “This is evident from both the inclusion of the religious employer exemption, as well as the legislative history of the ACA’s Women’s Health Amendment.” *Ibid.* (citing 2009 WL 4405642; 155 Cong. Rec. S12265, S12271 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 2009) (statement of Sen. Franken) (“The problem [with the current bill] is, several crucial women’s health services are omitted. [The Women’s Health Amendment] closes this gap.”); 2009 WL 4280093; 155 Cong. Rec. S12021-02, S12027 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2009) (statement of Sen. Gillibrand) (“... in general women of childbearing age spend 68 percent more in out-of-pocket health care costs than men.... This fundamental inequity in the current system is dangerous and discriminatory and we must act.”)).

Plaintiffs' reliance on the Affordable Care Act's grandfathering provision is misplaced for reasons already discussed. The grandfathering provision is "a reasonable plan for instituting an incredibly complex health care law while balancing competing interests." *Legatus*, 2012 WL 5359630, *9. This "gradual transition" does not "undercut[] the neutral purpose or general applicability of the mandate" to cover recommended preventive health services. *Korte*, 2012 WL 6553996, *7. That requirement applies to group health plans in general, and the provisions that address grandfathered plans apply to religious and secular employers alike.

Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, "[t]he fact that exemptions were made for religious employers does not indicate that the regulations seek to burden religion." App. 21. "Instead, it shows that the government made efforts to accommodate religious beliefs, which counsels in favor of the regulations' neutrality." *Ibid.* (citing *O'Brien*, 2012 WL 4481208, *8 ("the religious employer exemption presents a strong argument in favor of neutrality"); *see also Lee*, 455 U.S. at 260 (noting that "Congress granted an exemption" from social security taxes, "on religious grounds, to self-employed Amish and others").

Clearly, the Free Exercise Clause permits the government to provide an exemption for non-profit, religious institutions such as churches and their integrated auxiliaries, *see* 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B), and to address

religious objections raised by additional non-profit, religious organizations, *see* 78 Fed. Reg. 8456 (Feb. 6, 2013), without also extending such measures to for-profit, secular corporations. That is not “discriminat[ion] against some or all religious beliefs” or the imposition of “special disabilities on the basis of religious status.” *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 532, 533; *see also Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania*, 381 F.3d 202, 209 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito, J.) (“A law is ‘neutral’ if it does not target religiously motivated conduct either on its face or as applied in practice.”).

The religious employer exemption “does not differentiate between religions, but applies equally to all denominations.” *O’Brien*, 2012 WL 4481208, *9. “The religious employer exemption, by necessity, distinguishes between religious and secular employers, and HHS has selected a logical bright line between the two.” *Id.* at *10. Plaintiffs “see no difference between” a for-profit, secular corporation like Conestoga Wood and a non-profit, religious organization. *Korte*, 2012 WL 6553996, *8. As discussed above, however, “[r]eligious accommodations in related areas of federal law, such as the exemption for religious organizations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, are available to nonprofit religious organizations but not to for-profit secular organizations.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 8461-62. Consistent with this longstanding federal law, the Departments proposed to make certain accommodations for “nonprofit religious organizations, but not to include for-profit secular organizations.” *Id.* at 8462.

“Using well established criteria to determine eligibility for an exemption based on religious belief, such as the nonsecular nature of the organization and its nonprofit status, the [Affordable Care Act], through its implementing rules and regulations, both recognizes and protects the exercise of religion.” *Hobby Lobby Stores*, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1289. “The fact that the exceptions do not extend as far as plaintiffs would like does not make the mandate nonneutral.” *Ibid.*; *see also Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York*, 397 U.S. 664, 666 (1970) (upholding property tax exemptions for real property owned by non-profit, religious organizations and used exclusively for religious worship).

The Supreme Court has made clear that the government “may encourage the free exercise of religion by granting religious accommodations, even if not required by the Free Exercise Clause, without running afoul of the Establishment Clause.” *O’Brien*, 2012 WL 4481208, *10 (citing cases). “Such legislative accommodations would be impossible as a practical matter” if, as plaintiffs contend, the government could not distinguish between non-profit, religious organizations and for-profit, secular corporations. *Ibid.* (quoting *Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 85 P.3d 67, 79 (Cal. 2004)).

CONCLUSION

The denial of a preliminary injunction should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

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I hereby certify that the certify that this brief complies with the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and (6) because it has been prepared in 14-point Times New Roman, a proportionally spaced font. I further certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 10,475 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted under Rule 32(a)(7)(B)(iii), according to the count of Microsoft Word.

/s/ Alisa B. Klein
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I hereby certify that on April 15, 2013, I electronically filed the foregoing brief with the Clerk of this Court by using the appellate CM/ECF system and caused ten paper copies of the brief to be sent to the Court by Federal Express, overnight delivery. The participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.

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